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CEO Compensation after Harvester Director Departure
I examine the effect of post-IPO board member departure on CEO compensation. Theory
predicts that a reduction in board monitoring should results in an increase in CEO pay. Using a
novel dataset and empirical setting, I find that the effect is found only after the last ‘harvester
director’ departs, who represents the interests of a Venture Capital or Private Equity fund that
has backed the firm pre-IPO, and who has incentives to provide the strongest monitoring.
Moreover, equity compensation does not increase, contrary to theory. This paper sheds light on
important dynamics between board composition, monitoring and CEO compensation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
While much attention has been paid to venture-backed initial public offerings (IPOs),
almost none has been given to those firms after the IPO directors depart. However, agency
theory and prior research suggest that critical corporate policies, such as CEO compensation, are
most affected by large, sharp changes in governance. It is during the years after IPO that one
such sharp change occurs – the departure of “harvester” directors (i.e., directors representing
Venture Capital funds (VCs) - and Private Equity Groups (PEGs)) from the board, and in
studying that change I can test whether the change in governance really has a causal effect on
policies such as CEO compensation.
CEO compensation is sensitive to active monitoring by board members (Cronqvist &
Fahlenbrach, 2009). When directors representing outside funds join a board, monitoring
intensifies and reduces CEO compensation. However, not all settings are the same: for example,
when PEGs take public firms private, they increase CEO compensation (but also require CEOs
to purchase a substantial stake in the firm) (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2013).
Beatty & Zajac (1994) examined CEO compensation for IPO firms, using a sample of
IPOs from 1984. Their sample was strictly cross-sectional, and in their conclusions they
suggested that “another avenue for future research would involve assessing how and why
compensation contracts and corporate governance mechanisms change over time.” However, in
the more than twenty years since that article, research has not yet directly examined what
happens to CEO compensation when harvesters depart after the IPO (Berry, Fields & Wilkins
(2006) being the only notable exception; however, they found “no discernable pattern over time
in incentive-based pay”), though theory predicts that the sharp change in board composition and
decline in monitoring intensity should lead to increased CEO compensation. I examine the effect
3
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on CEO compensation of the departure of IPO directors, in particular harvester directors, who
have served on the board since the firm’s IPO, to test such predictions from agency theory in this
scarcely studied setting.
1.1 Research Question and Motivation
Agency theory predicts that board monitoring activities, including setting CEO
compensation, vary by the relative power of founders and external financiers. The departure after
IPO of “harvester” directors – powerful, active monitors able and motivated to constrain the
CEO – has not been studied extensively as a setting. But, like other settings with sharp changes
in board composition, it offers a means to testing predictions of the relationship between
governance and CEO pay. However, it is also distinct - with firm and governance dynamics that
are unique from other previously studied settings, such as in go-private leveraged buy-outs
(LBOs), or in pre-IPO VC-funded start-ups.
What effect does the departure of directors (in particular “harvester” (external VC- and
PE- fund) directors) who have served on the board since the firm’s IPO have on CEO
compensation, and how does it differ across departing directors? The contribution I seek to make
to the corporate governance and CEO compensation literature is three-fold: First, I re-examine
previously hypothesized governance-compensation relationships using in a novel empirical
setting (IPO firms around and after harvester departure) that provides an opportunity to confirm
and to contrast against existing empirical results. Second, using a treatment effect analysis, I find
partial support for a causal relationship between changes in governance and changes in CEO pay;
something which has proven to be difficult to resolve in prior research. Third, I draw attention to
and expand our knowledge of a phenomenon (last harvester departure) and dataset that has the
potential to deepen our understanding of the effects of external VC and PEG funding on firms
sometimes long after they have become publicly traded.
4
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1.2 The Complicated Relationship between IPO Director Departure and CEO
Compensation
I construct a panel of firm-years from Emerging Growth Company (EGC) firms,
following their IPO. I obtain the departure years of the directors on the board at IPO. I examine
the relationship between the presence, and then the departure, of those IPO directors and CEO
compensation. While I find statistically and economically significant relationships, I do not yet
have a causal claim.
Director departure is not a random event, but is endogenously determined by the directors
themselves. Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) discuss endogeneity extensively in their survey paper
on endogeneity and boards of directors. I address the endogeneity by using matched samples to
replicate a randomized experiment as closely as possible. I use a difference-in-differences
method to reduce selection bias and also to isolate a treatment effect. From the original sample, I
create a sub-sample of “harvester” IPOs that have experienced the departure of the last harvester
director from the board (the treatment) matched with other, similar “harvester” IPOs that have
yet to have the last harvester depart. In doing so, I minimize the effect of selection, as all firms
are “harvester” IPOs, with similar selection by “harvesters” for IPO, and all such firms are
plausibly similar in the likelihood of last harvester departure, making assignment to treated or
control group as good as random.
In the difference-in-differences matched-sample regressions I find that departure of the
last harvester has a negative marginal effect on equity compensation, but not direct (cash)
compensation, in the year of departure. However, joint F-tests of the main and interaction terms
of the difference-in-difference effect are only significant for direct compensation.
I also find that departure of the last harvester does not have a significant effect on a
change in compensation from the years before last harvester departure to the years after the last
5
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harvester departure. However, as with the comparison with the actual year of last harvester
departure, joint F-tests of the main and interaction terms of the difference-in-difference effect
before-and-after departure are only significant for direct compensation. Taken together, it
appears that departure of the last harvester has an immediate, but not lasting, effect on equity
compensation, and possibly a lasting effect on direct compensation.
One potentially confounding effect is change in compensation due to CEO turnover. I
find both in the unmatched sample regressions and in the matched sample difference-indifferences regressions that CEO turnover has an immediate effect on (increases equity,
decreases direct) compensation, but it only appears to have a lasting positive effect post-CEO
turnover on direct compensation, and it varies according to how many CEOs turnover within the
sample period.
These findings are not entirely consistent with agency theory. In particular, the lasting
increase in direct compensation is the only finding consistent with predictions based on agency
theory. The findings contribute to our understanding of the effects upon entrepreneurial firms
when the last “harvesters” depart post-IPO, and contribute to a better understanding of changes
on a board during a time in a public firm’s existence that is relatively understudied.

2. THEORETICAL GROUNDING AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 CEO Compensation
CEO compensation is sensitive to active monitoring by board members (Cronqvist &
Fahlenbrach, 2009); when directors representing outside funds join a board, monitoring
intensifies and affects CEO compensation. They also find significant heterogeneity across
different blockholders. “Executive compensation policies are systematically related to the
particular large shareholder present in a firm. Adding blockholder fixed effects to a model that
6
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already controls for important firm variation improves the model fit, and statistical tests reject
the null hypothesis that all blockholder effects are zero for most policies. The effects are mainly
concentrated in blockholder categories such as … private equity firms….”
Kaplan & Strömberg (2001), in their study of optimal contracting by venture capitalists,
find that VCs typically include restrictive terms such as non-compete agreements on founders,
and accordingly CEOs of entrepreneurial firms would want to be paid more than otherwise to
compensate for the restrictions. They also document that increased responsibilities, such as CEOchair duality, also increase CEO compensation in such firms.
Leslie & Oyer (2008) document that “PE-owned companies provide higher managerial
incentives to their top management: CEOs have almost twice as much equity, approximately
10% lower salary, and more variable cash compensation than their counterparts at comparable
public corporations.” While it is tempting to directly compare PEG-owned firms taken public to
first-time IPO firms with VC and PEG backing, it is important to distinguish between them.
“Private equity (PE) firms buy companies, fix them, and then sell them.” (Leslie & Oyer, 2008:
1) “A very important aspect of the equity programs is that managers are required to contribute
capital—managers purchase the equity with their own funds. One interviewee explained that
equity sharing is less about compensation of managers than it is about investment by managers.”
(Leslie & Oyer, 2008: 4) EGC IPOs are not about fixing broken firms to restore profitability and
growth, and their founders and CEOs already own substantial portions of the equity. The
comparison is limited to the notion of aligning managers’ with major outside shareholders’
financial interests.
Beatty & Zajac (1994) concluded that “the findings support our basic contingency
arguments: that firms’ use of executive compensation contracts to address managerial incentive

7
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problems is hampered by risk-bearing concerns stemming from the risk-aversion of top managers
and that firms seek to address this problem, which is greatest for the riskiest firms, by structuring
their boards of directors to ensure sufficient monitoring of managerial behavior.” That is,
incentive based compensation has limits to its effectiveness, but the addition of strong monitors
(i.e., harvester directors) substitutes for and mitigates this problem. Given this situation, it would
be natural to expect compensation, particularly equity compensation, to increase after the
departure of harvester directors from a board. Indeed, Ofek & Yermack (2000) note “boards’
compensation committees routinely cite the goal of increasing managerial ownership as the
rationale for equity-based pay.”
Cho & Shen (2007) “examine the changes in executive compensation at the top
management team (TMT) level following an environmental shift, and find that a dramatic
environmental change [airline deregulation] that heightens managerial discretion leads to greater
pay level and performance sensitivity of TMT compensation; and the greater the magnitude of
turnover among TMT members following the environmental shift, the greater the compensation
change.” While their empirical setting focuses on an exogenous environmental change rather
than an endogenous change in governance, their theoretical perspective is of increased
managerial discretion, which would certainly be the case in the situation where harvester
directors finally depart from the board after IPO.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
2.2.1 IPO Director Departure and Changes in CEO Compensation
Departures of a director from a firm’s board signal that something is changing in its
governance. Director departure from a healthy firm does affect governance (Campbell & Frye,
2009), just as it does when things go wrong at the firm (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2010).
Moreover, IPO directors are unique: they are not randomly chosen from among all directors;
8
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they are specifically chosen to signal a firm’s quality at IPO, and to provide essential guidance
and resources to the newly public firm (Kor & Misangyi, 2008; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, &
Hambrick, 2010). Current work supports the notion that IPO director departure also sends a
positive signal because directors tend to depart from the board when the firm performs well
(Jarosiewicz & Lee, 2017).
Positive firm performance tends to increase CEO compensation (Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2001), so if IPO director departure tends to send a positive signal about firm
performance, then I would expect IPO director departure to also be associated with increases in
CEO compensation. Also, as IPO directors depart from the board, withdrawing their guidance
and provision of resources, the CEO may face additional duties and responsibilities, which may
require additional compensation.
Hypothesis 1: IPO director departure is associated with an increase in the firm’s CEO
compensation.
2.2.2 Harvester IPO Director Departure and Changes in CEO Compensation
Outside directors are seen as better monitors than inside directors. Blockholder investors
who sit on the board are the strongest monitors. Adding one blockholder director to the board has
the greatest effect on CEO compensation (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).
Hypothesis 2: The increase in CEO compensation is stronger when harvester IPO
directors depart than when non-harvester IPO directors depart.
Blockholder investors who sit on the board are the strongest monitors. Therefore, even
when some harvester directors depart, so long as at least one harvester remains on the board to
protect their investment and help guide the firm, they will continue to constrain CEO
compensation. Only after the departure of the final harvester director does the balance of power
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truly shift to the CEO, who can then renegotiate their compensation more favorably with a board
now lacking the strongest monitors.
Hypothesis 3a: The increase in CEO compensation is weaker when harvester IPO
directors depart (while other harvester directors remain on the board) than when the last
harvester IPO director departs.
Hypothesis 3b: The increase in CEO compensation is greatest when the last harvester
IPO director departs.

3. RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 Empirical Design
I test my hypotheses using a sample of IPO firms to observe the effect of departure of
IPO directors on CEO compensation. The sample is focused on the outsider directors of young,
entrepreneurial firms that have gone public. These firms often have external financial backing
prior to the IPO, and consequently have harvester directors included on their IPO boards. I obtain
year of departure for the outsider directors and annual CEO compensation data. To control for
known alternative factors that also affect CEO compensation, I also obtain data related to firm
size, growth, profitability, industry, and year of CEO turnover (when those occur).
With that data, I first examine univariate changes in CEO compensation. Because my
strongest prediction is regarding last harvester departure, I focus on changes in CEO
compensation before and after those years.
Next, I follow Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) and regress CEO compensation against
the presence of harvester IPO directors to estimate the average effects when such harvester IPO
directors – who represent large, active blockholder investors – are included on the board. In
particular, in Table 3, I estimate models using equations (2) and (3) from their analysis.
10
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Also, using fixed effects regressions (like Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009), who in turn
follow Bertrand & Schoar (2003)), I estimate the impact of individual heterogeneity among nonharvester and harvester IPO directors upon CEO compensation. In particular, in Table 4, I
estimate models using equation (1) from their analysis, which includes year and firm fixed
effects, along with fixed effects for each individual (individual IPO directors in my dataset,
contrasted with individual blockholders in their dataset).
Finally, to test my hypotheses, I regress annual CEO compensation on indicators of
departures of non-harvester and harvester IPO directors, including an indicator for the departure
of the last harvester IPO director.
To control for the endogeneity of departure and control for selection bias, following
Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009), I then estimate a treatment effect using a difference-indifferences model. I create a matched sample of firms having external financial backing prior to
the IPO and harvester directors included on their IPO boards. The treated firms experience the
departure of the last harvester from the board, while the matched control firms do not, during the
sample period. Following the difference-in-difference methodology in Chhaochharia & Grinstein
(2009), I estimate the pre-vs-post treatment effect of director departure on CEO compensation
over the sample period, in order to test whether the effect persists over the sample period.
Finally, I re-estimate the regressions of annual CEO compensation, but using the matched
sample difference-in-differences model, to estimate a treatment effect of director departure on
CEO compensation just in the year of departure.
3.1.1 Data Sources
I build upon the research by Kenney et al. (2012), which is the first published work
directly addressing EGC IPOs, covering all EGC IPOs between 1996 and 2010 in the United

11
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States. I combined their dataset1 with firms’ financial information drawn from Jay Ritter’s IPO
dataset2 and from the Compustat database available in WRDS.3 I obtained director information
from Martin Kenney and Don Patton’s outsider (i.e., non-executive) director dataset for the same
EGC IPOs. For CEO compensation (and CEO turnover data), I used both BoardEx and
ExecuComp (from WRDS) datasets to obtain coverage as complete as possible of the dependent
variables.
For the starting and ending dates of IPO directors’ tenure on a firm’s board, I used
directors’ employment history from BoardEx. BoardEx has both announcement dates and event
dates (average and median differences between announcement and event dates are 23 days and 0
days, respectively) for company announcements4, while its employment history for directors
reports effective dates of joining and departure from boards.5 However, the Announcements file
does not cover all Employment History events (i.e., not all director join dates and departure dates
are recorded as announcements), so I choose to rely on the Employment History file, recognizing
that the join and departure dates are effective dates, not announcement dates.

1

Martin Kenney and Don Patton’s database includes board of director information on all Emerging Growth
Company initial public offerings (IPOs) on American stock exchanges and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) from January 1996 through December 2010. A description of the database and contact
information for Don Patton for requesting a copy of the database are found at:
http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/faculty/webpages/kenney/misc/IPO_database.htm.
2
Jay Ritter’s database contains a broad range of information, including post-IPO stock performance, on all U.S.
listed IPOs from 1975-present. Substantially all of the data is available across his data files at his website:
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. A non-public copy of an aggregate file was used for this analysis.
3
Wharton Research Database Services.
4
The BoardEx Company Announcements file contains both an announcement date and an effective date. The
average difference between announcement date and effective date is 23 days, while the median difference is 0 (both
dates are the same). The BoardEx Director Employment History file only contains the effective dates.
5
The 2013 BoardEx Glossary indicates that employment-related variables, such as “Time (Yrs) on Board,” are
based on the date of joining the Board and the date of leaving the board. However, if the join date is not available,
then the assumed date is the start of the financial year when the director is first quoted in the annual report.
Likewise, if the date of leaving is not known then the assumed date is the end of the financial year when the director
is last quoted in the annual report.
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3.1.2 Dependent Variables
BoardEx6 defines Direct Compensation as the sum of salary and cash bonus. BoardEx
defines Equity Linked Compensation as the sum of the value of shares awarded, the value of
LTIP awarded, and the estimated value of options awarded7. BoardEx defines Total
Compensation as the sum of Direct Compensation and Equity Linked Compensation.
ExecuComp’s ANNCOMP8 dataset defines Total Compensation and Direct Compensation
similarly to BoardEx, and so I calculate Equity Compensation from ANNCOMP data as the
difference between the other two variables.
ANNCOMP has a CEO flag, which facilitates identifying CEO compensation. However,
in working with and merging BoardEx and ANNCOMP data I discovered that it contains false
negatives (for some executives, the observations do not have the flag set to CEO, even though I
confirm that they are CEO observations). To correct that, I search within the executive role
variable in ANNCOMP9, and I also merge the ANNCOMP observations with the BoardEx
6

The BoardEx files I rely upon contain person-firm-year observations for directors of publicly traded firms, as well
as of private firms and of non-profit organizations. The dataset coverage is sparse before 1999, and my version’s
coverage ends shortly after 2013. The dataset covers a broad range of public firms, including many small and young
firms; however, its coverage greatly increases over time. Prior literature has noted that years prior to 2003 have a
marked decline in coverage, particularly among smaller firms. I have not made any adjustments for this type of
selection effect, though I feel it is important to point out, given the size of my final sample (only 77 treated firms
and 77 matched control firms) due to loss of observations with missing data. Among the EGC IPO firms I study, I
have no prior reason to believe that those that are included in the BoardEx data are substantially different from those
that are not, other than the size effect previously observed in early years of the dataset. Consistent with prior
literature, I include proxies for firm size as controls in my analyses, which should help partial out its impact, as the
observations remaining in my sample still exhibit significant variation as far as firm size.
7
BoardEx defines the estimated value of options awarded as: “a prediction of the value of the options awarded
during the period based on the latest closing stock price using an Generalised [sic] Black Scholes option pricing
model. Volatility is measured using a 100-day historic volatility. The Option Expiry Date uses the Country average
if Expiry Date is unavailable.”
8
The ANNCOMP dataset I rely upon contains person-firm-year observations for the top managers of publicly
traded firms, as reported in the management section of annual reports filed with the SEC. The dataset coverage
begins in 1992, and my version’s coverage ends shortly after 2013. The dataset mainly covers S&P 1500 firms, and
thus does not extensively cover the EGC IPO firms I study.
9
I search for “CEO” and its variants in the role description. I also screen out other phrases, such as “assistant to the
CEO” and others, which would create false positives. In any fiscal year where I obtain more than one CEO
observation in the compensation dataset, I first cross-reference the name and role in BoardEx. In a few instances
when this does not resolve the problem, I use CapitalIQ to access the firm’s top management team (TMT) profile,
and if necessary, access the underlying SEC filings directly.
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observations (often, one dataset has information for CEO-firm-years that are missing from the
other). I identify CEOs, their compensation and turnover dates in BoardEx from their roles in
their director profiles and in their employment history. CEO compensation exhibits a number of
outliers, so I winsorize the variables at the 2.5% level in each tail (by comparison, Cronqvist &
Fahlenbrach (2009) winsorize at the 1% level in each tail).
3.1.3 Independent Variables
“Departure” is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the IPO director departs from a firm’s
board within five years since the firm’s IPO (based on the departure date from BoardEx), else 0.
As mentioned earlier, “Departure” is endogenous, so I use it as a dependent variable for
propensity score matching.
“Harvester” is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the IPO director represents a VC or
PEG fund that provided external capital to the firm (and must therefore “harvest” their
investment), else 0. The Kenney-Patton dataset only flags IPO directors as “VC” or not.
However, the Ritter dataset flags IPOs as VC-backed, PEG-backed, or not backed. Therefore, I
flag any harvester as a “PEG director” if they only appear at PEG-backed IPOs, while any IPO
director only appearing at VC-backed or both at VC-backed and PEG-backed IPOs I flag as a
“VC director”.10
Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) document that CEO compensation differs if the CEO is
replaced than if the same CEO remains in a sample period. Accordingly, I include a “new CEO”
turnover identifier in the fiscal year when turnover occurs. Going further, multiple or frequent
CEO turnover might have a different effect than a single change in CEOs, so I also generate a

10

While an individual could be simultaneously, or sequentially, affiliated with a VC firm and a PEG fund, those
business models are very distinct and I expect such a situation to be an outlier. However, my identification scheme
would misclassify such individuals as being only VC-affiliated.
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“Post nth CEO change” variable (effectively, a counter or categorical variable) that indicates how
many times the CEO has changed in the sample period.
I mainly use the same control variables as in Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009), namely
lagged Tobin’s Q and lagged natural log of total assets, and where I follow Chhaochharia &
Grinstein (2009), I use the same control variables as they do, namely, natural log of sales
(“Sales”) and the natural log of one plus ROA (“ROA”).
The pool of EGC firms covers IPOs from 1996 to 2010 (15 years of IPOs), and IPO
director departures from 1999 to 2013 (matching the availability of director departure data from
BoardEx). The final sample is substantially reduced due to lack of availability of data, covering
303 EGC IPOs with observations from 1999 to 2013, resulting in 2,483 firm-year observations.
3.2 Sample Construction with Matching Methods
3.2.1 Matched Sample
Following Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2013), I use a matched sample analysis, to facilitate
a difference-in-differences analysis, such as those used in Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) and
Leslie & Oyer (2008). I created a 1-to-1 matched sample of harvester-backed IPOs. All firms in
the matched sample were chosen from the initial EGC IPO sample. All firms in the sample have
harvesters on the board, but matched control firms have not yet experienced the last harvester
departure. 80 “Treated” firms in the original sample experienced the departure of the last
harvester from their board during the sample period, but 3 treated firms were unmatched by 2digit SIC code and were excluded from the matched sample. Each of the remaining 77 treated
firms (representing 726 firm-year observations) was matched with a control firm by 2-digit SIC
code and the condition that the matched firm-years had to include the same fiscal year as the
fiscal year in which the last harvester departed from a treated firm’s board (e.g., for a treated firm
with a last harvester departure in 2008, the matched control firm’s firm-years had to include
15
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2008). The first 43 firms I was also able to match on IPO year (to control for years since IPO, a
proxy for time-based pressure for harvester directors to finish harvesting and depart) and on CEO
turnover. I matched another 29 firms only on CEO turnover without regard to match by IPO
year. I matched the final 5 firms without regard to IPO year or CEO turnover. In cases where a
treated firm was initially matched with multiple control firms, I chose the best match by
minimizing the difference in ROA in the fiscal year that coincided with the last harvester
departure year. For each firm, I included all firm-years with available data. The final combined
sample contained 1,482 firm-year observations.
3.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics and pairwise correlations among the variables under
study. Equity compensation dwarfs direct compensation, and is the driver of total compensation
(also noted by the 0.986 correlation between equity compensation and total compensation). The
coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) in equity compensation is much
larger than in direct compensation as well, meaning it is much more varied than direct
compensation. The mean natural log of total assets of 5.795 corresponds to an average firm size
of approximately 330 million dollars, confirming that the EGC IPO based sample is much
smaller than the typical, large public companies in the S&P 500, while the lagged Tobin’s Q
ratio mean of 3.373 indicates that these EGC firms are truly growth firms, well above the typical
Tobin’s Q ratio of closer to 2 for large public companies in the S&P 500.

Insert Table 1 about here
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3.3 Estimating the Effect of IPO Director Departure on Changes in CEO Compensation
3.3.1 Univariate Results
Table 2 presents a univariate analysis of CEO compensation around last harvester
director departure. The observations are split between those before the last harvester departure
and those after the last harvester departure, and also between firms with no CEO change and
those with (one or more) CEO changes.
In the observations without a CEO change, none of the components of CEO
compensation show any significant difference from before to after the departure of the last
harvester director. The same is true in the observations with CEO changes. There is, however, a
significant difference between firms with and without a change in CEO in the equity
compensation (and thus, total compensation) before the departure of the last harvester director,
which disappears after the departure of the last harvester director. At first blush, then, the
departure of the last harvester director does not appear to significantly affect any part of CEO
compensation, while the alternative explanation of CEO turnover does have some effect.

Insert Table 2 about here

3.3.2 Examining Effects of Harvesters and their Heterogeneity upon CEO Compensation
Table 3 follows from Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) Table 3, Columns 3 and 6. Its
purpose is to test whether the presence of “harvester” directors affects CEO compensation
(Models (1), (3) and (5)), and whether VC directors have a different effect from PEG directors
within the harvester category (Models (2), (4) and (6)). The coefficients for harvester are
statistically and economically significant for direct, equity and total compensation, and F-tests
strongly reject that VC and PEG director coefficients are equal to each other for any of the
17
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compensation variables. Interestingly, the coefficients on equity and total compensation are
strongly positive for the marginal effect of VC directors but strongly negative for the marginal
effect of PEG directors, opposite that in prior literature.
Similar to results from Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) Table 3, lagged Tobin’s Q is not
significant, while lagged log of total assets is strongly significant and positive, indicating that
while variance in growth does not appear to affect compensation, size most definitely does.

Insert Table 3 about here

Table 3 follows from Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) Table 4, Panel C. Its purpose is to
test whether the heterogeneity of individual “non-harvester” and individual “harvester” directors
(grouped by VC and PEG affiliation) differs in the effect upon CEO compensation. F-tests
strongly reject no heterogeneity in fixed effects among non-harvester directors. On the other
hand, F-tests cannot reject no heterogeneity in fixed effects among VC directors for any
component of CEO compensation, but they can for PEG directors, as far as equity (and thus,
total) compensation. Strictly for comparison, when the natural log of CEO compensation is
considered instead, the opposite is true as far as VC and PEG director heterogeneity is
concerned.11

11

Table 4 has an additional restriction: there are more individual directors than firm-year observations in the full
sample, resulting in insufficient degrees of freedom when including all individual fixed effects. So, to produce Table
4, I only include non-harvesters that are present at least at two or more firms in the sample (this is actually consistent
with what Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach do, as they follow Bertrand & Schoar’s moving dummy variable methodology
that requires multi-firm individuals for model identification). I do not similarly restrict the VC and PEG directors in
my sample. Theoretically, harvesters are much more influential than non-harvesters, so by only including nonharvesters at two or more firms I oversample those non-harvesters that are selected by firms as being more valuable
and influential, similar to harvesters. Empirically, given the much smaller pool of VC and PEG directors, I choose to
maximize the information retained in the Table 4 sample, even though it might lead to some sampling / selection
bias. Identification of harvester fixed effects is achieved because they are not perfectly collinear with firm and year
fixed effects (i.e., they are present more than one year in a firm, but not for all the years that firm appears in the
sample, so they are distinct from time-invariant firm fixed effects covering all the years in the sample, and they are
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Interestingly, the median fixed effect declines for equity and total compensation, but
increases for direct compensation, when harvester directors are included alongside non-harvester
directors. Consistent with the findings in Table 3, this is again contrary to previous findings in
the literature.

Insert Table 4 about here

3.3.3 Regressions of CEO Compensation on IPO Director Departure
Table 5 tests several hypotheses regarding the effect of IPO director departures on CEO
compensation, while controlling for size, growth, and CEO turnover. Model (1) tests whether
harvester and non-harvester director departures affect compensation equally. Model (2) tests
whether last harvester departure and other than last harvester departures affect compensation
equally. Model (3) examines whether CEO turnover affects CEO compensation. Model (4)
examines whether the last harvester departure effect is robust to inclusion of a CEO turnover
effect. Model (5) again tests whether last harvester departure and other than last harvester
departures affect compensation equally, while controlling for non-harvester departures and for
CEO turnover. Models (6) through (10) repeat the analysis for direct compensation.12

Insert Table 5 about here

distinct from cross-sectionally invariant year fixed effects, as they are only in one or a few firms in the crosssectional sample of each firm year). It is possible that the sampling / selection bias is at least partly responsible for
the strongly significant F-tests on non-harvester directors and also for the lack of strong significance on the
harvester directors.
12
Untabulated regressions of Total compensation (the sum of Direct and Equity compensation) result in identical
patterns of signs and significance as with Equity compensation Models (1) to (5), with only minor increases in
estimated coefficients.
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Model (1) shows that only the harvester departure coefficient on equity compensation is
statistically significant, but negative, though an F-test fails to reject that the coefficients are equal
at conventional statistical levels (p-value 0.125). Hypothesis 1 does not distinguish between
harvester and non-harvester IPO directors, but this finding suggests that such a distinction is
crucial, so given the non-significance of non-harvester departures, I do not believe Hypothesis 1
is strongly supported. However, this finding directly contradicts Hypothesis 2, that CEO
compensation increases more when harvester directors depart than when non-harvester directors
depart. Model (2) shows that only the last harvester departure coefficient on equity compensation
is statistically significant, but negative, and an F-test rejects that the coefficients are equal (pvalue 0.079). While the statistical significance and relative magnitudes of the effects support
Hypotheses 3a and Hypotheses 3b, the negative sign directly contradicts the predicted increase in
CEO compensation.
Model (3) indicates that CEO turnover affects CEO compensation, which was expected,
and will be used as a control in examining director departure effects in the presence of this
potential alternative explanation. Model (4) examines does confirm that the last harvester
departure effect is robust to inclusion of a CEO turnover effect, and Model (5) again confirms
that the last harvester departure affect compensation more strongly than other than last harvester
departures, while controlling for non-harvester departures and for CEO turnover. Unfortunately,
the sign remains the opposite of the predicted increase in compensation.
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Models (6) through (10) generally find the same results for director departure effect on
direct compensation, but that CEO turnover has a statistically significant and negative effect on
direct compensation.13
3.3.4 Matched Sample Summary Statistics
Table 6 presents summary statistics and pairwise correlations among the variables in the
only-harvester-backed-IPO matched sample. The sample statistics and correlations for the
variables carried over from the main sample remain mostly unchanged. However, direct
compensation decreases slightly and equity compensation increases slightly from the main
sample, and statistics related to harvester departure increase naturally due to the restriction to a
harvester-backed-IPO-only sample.

Insert Table 6 about here

3.3.5 Last Harvester Departure Treatment Effect on Post-vs-Pre Departure Levels of
Compensation
Following Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) (“CG”), I estimate a treatment effect for the
departure of the last harvester director on pre-vs-post departure levels of CEO compensation.
However, they do not use a matched sample, thus industry-year fixed effects are appropriate in
their analysis. My sample matches by industry in all matched firms, so while year effects are still
relevant, industry effects are less so.14

13

Untabulated regressions of Total compensation (the sum of Direct and Equity compensation) result in identical
patterns of signs and significance as with Equity compensation Models (1) to (5), with only minor increases in
estimated coefficients.
14
Untabulated regressions including industry-year fixed effects indicate qualitatively similar results, though
standard errors increase. Notably, the only coefficients with changes in significance are that POST 1st CEO change
becomes significant in Models (8) and (10). Otherwise, all margins and margins contrasts tests maintain the same
(in-)significance as in the tabulated results.
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Model (1) most closely resembles CG, including the same control variables (Sales and
ROA, as they define them) interacted with the pre-vs-post period indicator variable. Model (1)
includes an estimated effect for tenure, which is insignificant (β=-0.018, s.e.=0.012, p-val 0.128)
and is not carried forward into other models. Model (2) differs only from Model (1) by not
including tenure. Model (3) differs from Model (2) only in using year fixed effects instead of
industry-year fixed effects. Thus, Models (1)-(2) include industry-year and firm fixed effects,
while Models (3)-(10) include year and firm fixed effects.
Models (1)-(7) follow the CG regression specification, which excludes estimation of
main effects for interaction terms, whereas Models (8)-(10) include them. No explanation is
found in the original article for their exclusion, but they potentially act as omitted variables in
estimating the true effect of the interacted indicator variables, so they are included in the final
three models used to re-examine the hypotheses.
Models (1)-(4) follow CG dependent variable specification of log of compensation,
whereas Models (5)-(10) revert to the untransformed dependent variables, consistent with the
rest of the analysis. Models (1)-(7) follow CG regression specification, interacting pre-vs-post
period dummy with controls. However, as the Assets coefficients are not different in Models (5)(7), and Tobins Q coefficients are not different in Model (6), those interactions are removed in
Models (8)-(10), respectively. Models (1)-(7) are estimated using the REGHDFE command in
Stata 14.2; Models (8)-(10) estimated using the REGRESS command in Stata 14.2. I do this
because the inclusion of the main effect indicator variable “treated” results in an unreliable and
nonsensical coefficient using REGHDFE (standard error magnitude of 108), while using
REGRESS results in a reliable and reasonable standard error estimate.
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Standard errors are clustered by firm-years for Models (1)-(7) following the CG
specification, and clustered by firm for Models (8)-(10). Clustering by firm-year treats separate
firm-years as independent, while clustering by firm considers the intertemporal correlation across
firm-years for each firm. Untabulated regressions clustering by firm-year indicate qualitatively
similar results, with smaller standard errors, as expected.
While models (1) through (7) are presented to show a natural progression, one change at
a time, from the original CG specifications to those most directly applicable to the hypotheses, I
focus here on discussion of models (8) through (10), which directly test the proposed hypotheses.
The coefficients of the interaction between treatment and post-vs-pre last harvester
departure are not significant for any CEO compensation component. However, a more
appropriate test is whether the average marginal effects are significantly different between the
treated and untreated observations. Unfortunately, Stata is unable to directly compute a test of
the contrast of the average marginal effects. Instead, I present an F-test of the combined main
and interaction term coefficients that together determine the difference between treated and
untreated departure treatment effects. The F-test is only statistically significant for the departure
treatment effect on direct compensation, and the sum of the coefficients is positive. This lends
some (limited) support to the hypothesis that CEO compensation increases after the departure of
the last harvester director. Moreover, the nature of the analysis suggests that this increase is a
treatment effect rather than a selection effect.

Insert Table 7 about here
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3.3.6 Last Harvester Departure Treatment Effect on Year of Departure Compensation
Table 8, using the difference-in-differences matched sample framework, re-examines the
hypotheses regarding the effect of last harvester departure on CEO compensation in the year of
departure, while controlling for size, growth, and CEO turnover. Models (1)-(3) present year of
last harvester departure-vs-other years difference in compensation, differenced between treated
and control firms.
The sample is the same matched sample as I used for the Table 7 difference-indifferences treatment effect regressions. The models replicate the analysis from Table 5, with the
addition of an interaction for “treated” in order to compute difference-in-differences between
treated and matched control firms. “Treated” firms experienced the departure of the last harvester
from their board during the sample period, while matched control firms have not.

Insert Table 8 about here

Model (1) shows that the marginal effect from last harvester departure on equity
compensation is statistically significant, but negative. Model (2) shows that the marginal effect
from last harvester departure on direct compensation is not statistically significant, but that the
treated indicator is strongly significant and positive. Model (3) shows that the marginal effect
from last harvester departure on total compensation is statistically significant, but negative.
Again, a more appropriate test is whether the average marginal effects are significantly
different between the treated and untreated observations. Unfortunately, Stata is again unable to
directly compute a test of the contrast of the average marginal effects. Instead, I present an F-test
of the combined main and interaction term coefficients that together determine the difference
between treated and untreated departure treatment effects. The F-test is only statistically
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significant for the departure treatment effect on direct compensation, and the sum of the
coefficients is positive. This again lends some (limited) support to the hypothesis that CEO
compensation increases after the departure of the last harvester director. Moreover, the nature of
the analysis suggests that this increase is a treatment effect rather than a selection effect.

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
4.1 Harvester IPO Directors Matter
Univariate results are inconclusive as to changes in CEO compensation after the
departure of the last harvester director, but they do support that CEO turnover might potentially
explain changes in CEO compensation. However, I find that the presence of harvester directors
(particularly, VC harvester directors) does appear to have a positive effect on equity, and
therefore, total CEO compensation, but a negative effect on direct CEO compensation.
Curiously, there is significant individual heterogeneity in the effect on CEO compensation
among IPO directors. Accounting for non-harvester and harvester director heterogeneity
improves the adjusted R2 of models for direct, equity and total compensation, with the median
fixed effect on equity and total compensation clearly appearing to be different from zero. When I
consider IPO director departures, I find that only the last harvester director departure has a
statistically significant effect on equity and on direct compensation.
4.2 Last Harvester Director Departure Treatment Effect
When I take into account the endogeneity of departure and isolate a treatment effect
separate from the selection effect potentially present in the main sample, I again find that the
departure of the last harvester director has a significant treatment effect on CEO compensation,
when contrasting harvester funded firms with last harvester departure against matched harvester
funded firms without last harvester departure. The marginal effect (i.e., the interaction term of
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last harvester departure and of treated firm) of this treatment is significant for equity
compensation (and therefore total compensation) in the year of departure, where it contradicts
the hypothesized relationship. However, the F-test of the overall treatment effect (i.e., the sum of
the terms constituting the difference-in-differences) is only significant for direct compensation,
both in the year of last harvester departure and in the change in compensation from years before
that departure to years after the departure. Here, however, the sum of the coefficients is positive,
consistent with the hypothesized relationship.
IPO directors appear to affect CEO compensation, but the hypotheses are only partially
supported. Being a harvester director or not, and being a VC or PEG harvester director, affects
CEO compensation, and even individual differences within those groups appear to have an effect
on CEO compensation. Among IPO directors, only the departure of the last harvester director
appears to have a treatment effect, but even then it only agrees with the theoretically motivated
hypothesis with regard to direct compensation, but not with regard to equity compensation.
4.3 Unresolved Matters
Beatty & Zajac (1994) find “that the levels of monitoring observed are inversely related
to the levels of managerial incentives used,” which is contrary to my findings, which suggest
instead that a decline in monitoring intensity (the departure of the last harvester director) is
associated with a decline in equity compensation. On the other hand, Guthrie, Sokolowsky, &
Wan (2012), in their critique of Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009), find the following: “our
results indicate that (i) board independence does not affect the level of CEO pay; (ii)
compensation committee independence causes CEO pay to increase; and (iii) the increase in
CEO pay occurs only in the presence of blockholder directors or high institutional ownership
concentration, both of which are considered to be monitoring substitutes. These results imply
that the compensation committee independence requirement has had the unintended consequence
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of increasing CEO pay, especially in firms with effective shareholder monitoring…. These
empirical findings stand in sharp contrast to the prediction of the managerial power hypothesis
that director independence effectively curbs rent extraction in the form of excessive CEO pay.”
My dataset is only a convenience sample, and any inferences are limited by differences
between it and the overall population of EGC IPO firms (and the larger set of all IPO firms). Out
of 1,700 EGC IPO firms from 1996 through 2010, I only have 303 firms in my main estimation
sample, and 154 firms in my final matched sample. Even among the firms in my sample, I am
missing a number of CEO-firm-year observations, as well as annual information regarding the
IPO directors. It is possible that I have false negatives, meaning that some IPO directors and
CEOs have departed within the sample but their departure dates are not properly captured in
either the BoardEx or ANNCOMP datasets. This would underestimate the effect of director
departure and the control for CEO turnover, respectively. Likewise, I have firm-years with
missing CEO compensation data. These concerns can only be alleviated by hand-collecting the
missing data. Furthermore, my dataset ends in 2013, which truncates and omits many potential
IPO director exits after 2013, which become more relevant particularly for those IPOs near the
2010 end of the range of years in my sample.
Before last harvester IPO director departure, are CEOs paid more than their industry
peers? While the departure of arguably the strongest and most likely director to push to constrain
CEO compensation does not lead to a plausible explanation of why compensation should decline,
it at least provides room for the board to make an adjustment based on a comparative logic.
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) examine a number of different types of blockholders
and their varying effects on CEO compensation. I only examine two: VC-firms and PEG funds.
Also, I only examine them if they are represented on the board at IPO, and I only hypothesize
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regarding the effect of their departure after IPO. One other aspect that I have not controlled for is
a potential substitution effect, where harvester departures from the board are replaced by other
blockholders that have been found to be active and to have an effect on CEO compensation.
Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) examine the effect on CEO compensation of several
other monitoring mechanisms, namely concentration of institutional holdings, exogenous
regulatory shocks (Sarbanes-Oxley) to director independence, corporate governance quality (as
measured by Institutional Shareholder Services). They also examine the effect of accounting
conventions (i.e., the change in expensing of stock options due to FAS123 and its successors) on
stock options as part of CEO compensation. My work has not focused on or controlled for these
alternative explanations and factors, though they are at least potentially present in my dataset as
well.
Berry et al. (2006) examine CEO compensation in a panel of IPO firms up to 11 years
after IPO, and they differentiate their sample among firms that are acquired, delisted or
surviving. My work has not focused on these differences, though they potentially could explain
both one motivation for IPO director, and particularly harvester director, departure and also
changes in CEO compensation.
I examine direct and equity-linked CEO compensation. However, direct compensation
includes both salary and cash bonuses, which have different theoretical motivations and have
been shown empirically to react differently to changing conditions in a firm’s environment.
Likewise, equity-linked compensation is an aggregate dollar amount representing very different
forms of compensation, including stock, restricted stock, stock options, phantom stock, LTIPs
and even the cash value of retirement benefits. Prior literature has examined each of these
components of CEO compensation in finer detail, both theoretically and empirically. It is
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possible the predictions and hypotheses concerning director departure, particularly last harvester
director departure, may differ substantially with regard to each of these sub-components of CEO
compensation, and that a similarly detailed examination, using my empirical setting, might
uncover varied patterns of effects and of changes in such compensation.
Lastly, at least one other alternative explanation grounded in optimal contracting
literature is that, particularly in externally funded IPOs, the observed changes in CEO
compensation are contractually set as part of the negotiations between the entrepreneurs and the
external financiers. In that case, what is observed is caused indirectly due to those prior
contractual terms (or their expiration). I have not examined the CEO employment agreements
and external funding agreements to systematically disprove, or find support for, that alternative
explanation. What is clear from the current analysis is that the treatment effect appears to be
isolated to coincide with the departure of the last harvester IPO director. Given the departure of
multiple harvester directors from some firms, this would require either that such a contingency
be required by all the harvester directors, or at least no later than the last investment round with
new harvester directors, or that the determinants of such a contingency also determine which
harvester director would be last to depart.
Moreover, prior literature has shown that not all investments by harvester firms (VCs and
PEGs) correspond to a harvester director joining the board. I do not examine the effect on CEO
compensation of such non-board-participating harvester firms completely harvesting their
investments, even though prior literature finds evidence of the parallel situation that harvester
directors do not depart from boards until they also completely harvest their investments, which is
the setting that I do examine. Finding a similar change in CEO compensation in situations of
complete harvest without harvester director participation could strengthen the argument for the
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alternative explanation, as while such harvesters still actively influence CEOs and management,
they obviously do not have board participation and cannot directly influence compensation
practices in the same way as harvester directors, but potentially rely more on initial bargaining
and contracting.
In this initial effort to re-examine previously hypothesized governance-compensation
relationships using the novel empirical setting of “harvester” IPO director departures, I find
partial support for a plausibly causal relationship between changes in governance and changes in
CEO pay. However, I find just as much room for future empirical and theoretical improvements
in understanding this governance-CEO compensation relationship.
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6. TABLES
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Main (Unmatched) Sample
Mean

Std. Dev.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Direct Compensation ($MM)

0.560

0.319

2. Equity Compensation ($MM)

2.583

4.102

0.172**

3. Total Compensation ($MM)

3.121

3.948

0.267**

4. Non-Harvester Departure this yr (1/0)

0.151

0.401

-0.014

-0.022

5. Not Last Harvester Departure this yr (1/0)

0.039

0.194

-0.023

0.028

0.022

0.002

6. Last Harvester Departure this yr (1/0)

0.035

0.184

-0.044*

-0.041*

-0.044*

0.043*

-0.038†

7. CEO Turnover this yr (1/0)

0.125

0.331

-0.078**

0.109**

0.101**

0.044*

-0.026

-0.023

8. Lag LN Assets (LN of MM)

5.795

1.243

0.341**

0.294**

0.341**

-0.011

-0.014

-0.040*

0.049*

9. Lag Tobin’s Q (ratio)

3.373

5.575

-0.088**

0.167**

0.137**

-0.026

0.008

-0.013

0.025

8

0.986**
-0.020

-0.103**

Statistics for main regression sample used for Table 1 through Table 5. N=2,483, except for CEO Turnover this year (N=2,194).
†, *, ** Denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, levels, respectively.
CEO compensation as reported in BoardEx or ExecuComp (in millions of dollars). Direct compensation includes salary plus cash bonus. Equity compensation is “equity-linked” compensation, as
reported, which includes stock, options, LTIPS and other equity-based components of compensation. Total compensation is the sum of direct and equity compensation. Where two of three variables are
reported, the third is calculated from the two reported values. If two variables are missing, that observation is excluded.
Non-Harvester Departure this year is an indicator for the departure during the fiscal year of an IPO director (but not affiliated with a VC or PEG fund), an IPO director being on the board of directors as
of the IPO of the firm.
Not Last Harvester Departure this year is an indicator for the departure during the fiscal year of an IPO director affiliated with a VC or PEG fund (a “Harvester” director), but not the last such
“Harvester” to depart from the board after the IPO.
Last Harvester Departure this year is an indicator for the departure during the fiscal year of an IPO director affiliated with a VC or PEG fund (a “Harvester” director), where the departure is of the last
such “Harvester” to depart from the board after the IPO.
CEO Turnover this year is an indicator for a new CEO during the fiscal year (i.e., the CEO listed at fiscal year-end is not the same as the one listed in the prior fiscal year-end. Strictly speaking, any
interim CEOs starting and departing in between fiscal year ends are not captured in this data generation process).
Lag LN Assets is the lagged value of the natural log of total assets.
Lag Tobin’s Q is the lagged value of the Tobin’s Q ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets (calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value
of equity plus the book value of debt).

32

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3042780

Table 2. Univariate Analysis of CEO Compensation1 Around Last
Harvester Departure
Pre Last Harvester
Departure
Mean
Median
No CEO change in firm sample

Post Last
Harvester Departure
Mean
Median

Obs=850

Pre-vs-Post
2-sample Tests
t-stat
p-value

Obs=109

Direct Compensation

0.554

0.483

0.563

0.481

0.61

0.545

Equity Compensation

1.879

0.938

2.204

0.953

-0.90

0.370

Total Compensation

2.440

1.529

2.699

1.387

-0.75

0.452

CEO change in firm sample

Obs=1195

Obs=329

Direct Compensation

0.566

0.498

0.560

0.500

0.32

0.750

Equity Compensation

3.018

1.164

2.949

1.839

0.27

0.785

Total Compensation

3.539

1.786

3.506

2.314

0.13

0.894

No CEO change vs. CEO change
2-sample Tests

t-stat

p-value

t-stat

p-value

Direct Compensation

-0.83

0.409

-0.77

0.439

Equity Compensation

-6.61

<0.001

-1.84

0.068

Total Compensation

-6.60

<0.001

-2.09

0.038

Means shown rounded from actual, unrounded values; their related t-statistics and p-values are from the unrounded estimates. Statistics for main
regression sample used for Table 1 through Table 5, N=2,483.
1

CEO compensation as reported in BoardEx or ExecuComp (in millions of dollars). Direct compensation includes salary plus cash bonus. Equity
compensation is “equity-linked” compensation, as reported, which includes stock, options, LTIPS and other equity-based components of
compensation. Total compensation is the sum of direct and equity compensation. Where two of three variables are reported, the third is calculated
from the two reported values. If two variables are missing, that observation is excluded.
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Table 3. Average Harvester Effects on CEO Compensation
DV=CEO Compensation 1

(1) Total

(2) Total

(3) Direct

(4) Direct

(5) Equity

(6) Equity

Harvester indicator
VC/PEG director

0.986**

-0.296***

1.409***

(0.467)

(0.028)

(0.509)

Harvester category
VC director

PEG director

0.986**

-0.296***

1.409***

(0.467)

(0.028)

(0.509)

-1.123**

-0.120***

-0.832

(0.545)

(0.032)

(0.591)

Control variables
Lagged Tobin’s Q

0.025

0.025

-0.000

-0.000

0.034

0.034

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.044)

(0.044)

0.830***

0.830***

0.060***

0.060***

0.787***

0.787***

(0.205)

(0.205)

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.222)

(0.222)

Observations

2,483

2,483

2,483

2,483

2,483

2,483

Adj. R2

0.356

0.356

0.535

0.535

0.320

0.320

Lagged ln Total Assets

F-Tests:
VC director = PEG director

F-stat 169.78
p-val <0.001

F-stat 196.71
p-val <0.001

F-stat 188.89
p-val <0.001

This table follows Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) “Large shareholders and corporate policies” Table 3, Columns 3 and 6. Its purpose is to test
whether the presence of “Harvester” directors affects CEO compensation, and whether VC directors have a different effect from PEG directors
within the Harvester category.
1

CEO compensation as reported in BoardEx or ExecuComp (in millions of dollars). Direct compensation includes salary plus cash bonus. Equity
compensation is “equity-linked” compensation, as reported, which includes stock, options, LTIPS and other equity-based components of
compensation. Total compensation is the sum of direct and equity compensation. Where two of three variables are reported, the third is calculated
from the two reported values. If two variables are missing, that observation is excluded.
Standard errors, clustered by firm, shown in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Director Fixed Effects and CEO Compensation
F-tests on fixed effects for
VCs

non-harvesters

PEGs

N
Obs.

Adj
R2

2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483

.356
.368
.370
.535
.541
.544
.320
.329
.332

2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483
2,483

.436
.447
.453
.540
.548
.549
.345
.350
.355

Median
FE

A. Actual Compensation
Total Compensation
Total Compensation
Total Compensation
Direct Compensation
Direct Compensation
Direct Compensation
Equity Compensation
Equity Compensation
Equity Compensation

3.46***
3.42***

(<.0001, 16)
(<.0001, 16)

1.00

(0.478, 38)

3.94***

(0.008, 3)

2.94***
2.99***

(<.0001, 16)
(<.0001, 16)

1.27

(0.123, 38)

1.09

(0.353, 3)

2.75***
2.74***

(<.0001, 16)
(<.0001, 16)

0.93

(0.596, 38)

4.83***

(0.002, 3)

1.295
0.399
-0.001
0.010
1.261
0.586

B. Natural Log of Actual Compensation
Total Compensation
Total Compensation
Total Compensation
Direct Compensation
Direct Compensation
Direct Compensation
Equity Compensation
Equity Compensation
Equity Compensation

3.62***
3.63***

(<.0001, 16)
(<.0001, 16)

1.54**

(0.019, 38)

1.36

(0.253, 3)

3.29***
3.34***

(<.0001, 16)
(<.0001, 16)

1.28

(0.122, 38)

0.18

(0.908, 3)

2.03***
2.02***

(<.0001, 16)
(<.0001, 16)

1.35*

(0.078, 38)

1.67

(0.172, 3)

0.298
0.212
0.028
0.060
0.689
0.684

This table follows Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) “Large shareholders and corporate policies” Table 4, Panel C. Its purpose is to test whether
the heterogeneity of individual “Non-Harvester” and individual “Harvester” directors (grouped by VC and PEG affiliation) differs in the effect
upon CEO compensation.
Each regression includes lagged Tobin’s Q and lagged natural log of total assets as time-varying firm-level controls, as well as fiscal year and
firm fixed effects.
Reported are the F-tests for the joint significance of the non-harvester director fixed effects, VC director fixed effects, and PEG director fixed
effects. For each F-test, I report the value of the F-statistic, the p-value, and the number of constraints. I also include the median estimated fixed
effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 has an additional restriction: there are more individual directors than firm-year observations in the full sample, resulting in insufficient
degrees of freedom when including all individual fixed effects. So, to produce Table 4, I only include non-harvesters that are present at least at
two or more firms in the sample (this is actually consistent with what Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach do, as they follow Bertrand & Schoar’s moving
dummy variable methodology that requires multi-firm individuals for model identification). I do not similarly restrict the VC and PEG directors
in my sample. Theoretically, harvesters are much more influential than non-harvesters, so only including non-harvesters at two or more firms I
oversample those non-harvesters that are selected by firms as being more valuable and influential, similar to harvesters. Empirically, given the
much smaller pool of VC and PEG directors, I choose to maximize the information retained in the Table 4 sample, even though it might lead to
some sampling / selection bias. Identification of harvester fixed effects is achieved because they are not perfectly collinear with firm and year
fixed effects (i.e., they are present more than one year in a firm, but not for all the years that firm appears in the sample, so they are distinct from
time-invariant firm fixed effects covering all the years in the sample, and they are distinct from cross-sectionally invariant year fixed effects, as
they are only in one or a few firms in the cross-sectional sample of each firm year). It is possible that the sampling / selection bias is at least partly
responsible for the strongly significant F-tests on non-harvester directors and also for the lack of strong significance on the harvester directors.
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Table 5. Regressions of CEO Compensation on One Year Prior IPO Director Departure and CEO Turnover
DV = CEO Compensation:

(A)
(B)
(C)

(1) Equity

Non-harvester
departures last year

0.136
(0.234)

Harvester departures
last year
Not last Harvester
departures last year

-0.199
(0.297)

(D)

Last Harvester
departure last year

(E)

CEO turnover this
year

(2) Equity

(3) Equity

(4) Equity

(5) Equity

(6) Direct

0.111
(0.228)

(7) Direct

(8) Direct

(9) Direct

-0.003
(0.012)

(10) Direct
-0.000
(0.012)

0.017
(0.018)
0.567
(0.557)

0.560
(0.546)

0.047
(0.029)

-1.040***
(0.263)

-1.003***
(0.269)

-0.020
(0.022)

0.933***
(0.329)

0.918***
(0.330)

0.913***
(0.327)

-1.041***
(0.272)

0.048
(0.030)
-0.028
(0.021)

-0.025
(0.021)

-0.095***
(0.022)

-0.095***
(0.022)

-0.095***
(0.022)

Control variables
Lagged Tobin’s Q
Lagged ln Total
Assets
Observations
Adj. R2

0.045
(0.053)

0.045
(0.053)

0.045
(0.055)

0.044
(0.055)

0.046
(0.055)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

0.847***
(0.250)

0.826***
(0.248)

0.846***
(0.251)

0.825***
(0.250)

0.825***
(0.251)

0.067***
(0.014)

0.067***
(0.014)

0.068***
(0.014)

0.067***
(0.014)

0.067***
(0.014)

2,162
0.345

2,162
0.348

2,162
0.351

2,162
0.353

2,162
0.353

2,162
0.538

2,162
0.539

2,162
0.547

2,162
0.547

2,162
0.547

F-tests:
(A) = (B)
(C) = (D)

F-stat 0.70
p-val 0.403

F-stat 0.82
p-val 0.367
F-stat 7.64***
p-val 0.006

F-stat 7.60***
p-val 0.006

F-stat 4.44**
p-val 0.036

F-stat 4.98**
p-val 0.026

This table tests several hypotheses regarding the effect of IPO director departures on CEO compensation, while controlling for size, growth, and CEO turnover. Models (1) tests whether harvester and
non-harvester director departures affect compensation equally. Model (2) tests whether last harvester departure and other than last harvester departures affect compensation equally. Model (3) examines
whether CEO turnover affects CEO compensation. Model (4) examines whether the last harvester departure effect is robust to inclusion of a CEO turnover effect. Model (5) again tests whether last
harvester departure and other than last harvester departures affect compensation equally, while controlling for non-harvester departures and for CEO turnover. Models (6) through (10) repeat the analysis
for direct compensation.
Standard errors, clustered by firm, shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CEO compensation as reported in BoardEx or ExecuComp (in millions of dollars). Direct compensation includes salary plus cash bonus. Equity compensation is “equity-linked” compensation, as
reported, which includes stock, options, LTIPS and other equity-based components of compensation.
1

Untabulated regressions of Total compensation (the sum of Direct and Equity compensation) result in identical patterns of signs and significance as with Equity compensation Models (1) to (5) above,
with only minor increases in estimated coefficients.
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Matched Sample
1. Direct
Compensation ($MM)
2. Equity
Compensation ($MM)
3. Total Compensation
($MM)
4. Post Last Harvester
Departure (1/0)
5. POST CEO change
(1 .. 5)
6. Non-Harvester
Departure this yr (1/0)
7. Not Last Harvester
Departure this yr (1/0)
8. Last Harvester
Departure this yr (1/0)
9. CEO Turnover this
yr (1/0)
10. LN Sales (LN of
MM)
11. LN ROA (LN of
ratio)
12. Lag LN Assets (LN
of MM)
13. Lag Tobin’s Q
(ratio)

Mean

Std.
Dev.

0.504

0.260

2.836

4.335

0.247**

3.276

4.114

0.314**

0.993**

0.457

0.498

0.145**

0.027

0.042

0.693

0.950

0.033

0.104**

0.114**

0.126

0.372

-0.043

-0.035

-0.039

-0.059*

-0.025

0.052

0.223

-0.053*

-0.026

-0.032

-0.139**

-0.064*

0.032

0.108

0.311

-0.034

-0.068**

-0.069**

-0.319**

-0.058*

0.048†

-0.041

0.133

0.340

-0.096**

0.098**

0.094**

0.086**

0.427**

0.045

-0.008

-0.056*

5.147

1.568

0.226**

0.251**

0.269**

0.192**

0.254**

-0.043

-0.052*

-0.033

0.043

0.015

0.295

0.029

0.074**

0.076**

0.056*

0.088**

-0.043

-0.029

-0.038

-0.006

5.742

1.306

0.330**

0.331**

0.356**

0.203**

0.242**

-0.055*

-0.006

-0.020

0.054*

0.713**

3.530

6.687

0.202**

0.186**

-0.147**

-0.087**

-0.013

-0.007

-0.045†

0.009

0.014

1

-0.032

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0.252**

0.526**
0.215**
-0.038

-0.063*

Statistics for difference-in-differences regressions matched sample used for Tables 6 through Table 8. N=1,416, except for LN Sales (N=1,403), LN ROA (N=1,387), and Lag Tobin’s Q (N=1,338).
†, *, ** Denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, levels, respectively.
POST Last Harvester Departure this year is an indicator for the years including, and after, the departure during the fiscal year of an IPO director affiliated with a VC or PEG fund (a “Harvester”
director), where the departure is of the last such “Harvester” to depart from the board after the IPO.
POST CEO Change is a categorical variable indicating the number of changes in CEO that have happened in the sample since IPO up through that fiscal year. For example, a firm with three distinct
CEOs will have firm-year observations with POST CEO Change equal either to 0, 1, or 2 to indicate the two changes in CEO. In the sample, the maximum number of CEO changes for any given firm is
5 (i.e., in the sample, at least one firm had 6 different CEOs).
LN Sales is the natural log of revenues (reported in millions).
LN ROA is the natural log of 1 plus ROA, with ROA calculated as EBITDA divided by total assets.
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Table 7. Last Harvester Departure Treatment Effect on Post-vs-Pre Departure Levels of Compensation1
DV = CEO Compensation 2:

(1) ln(Total)

(2) ln(Total)3

(3) ln(Total)4

(4) ln(Total)

(5) Total

(6) Direct

(7) Equity

(8) Total

(9) Direct

(10) Equity

Panel A. Difference-in-Differences Regression Estimates
β1

Treated

β2

POST last Harvester
departure

β3

Treated*POST last
Harvester departure

0.884
(0.822)
-0.533
(0.368)

0.194***
(0.058)
-0.019
(0.021)

0.650
(0.850)
-0.485
(0.392)

0.017
(0.164)
0.246
(0.183)

-0.047
(0.127)
0.234**
(0.117)

-0.018
(0.126)
0.136
(0.117)

-0.102
(0.129)
0.153
(0.120)

-0.612
(0.447)
0.525
(0.415)

0.022
(0.027)
-0.032
(0.025)

-0.732
(0.474)
0.651
(0.445)

-0.510
(0.569)
0.545
(0.510)

0.030
(0.031)
-0.032
(0.033)

-0.649
(0.603)
0.668
(0.537)

-0.164
(0.284)
-0.031
(0.353)

0.129
(0.170)
-0.068
(0.213)

-0.036
(0.166)
-0.292
(0.206)

0.026
(0.175)
-0.050
(0.224)

0.080
(0.594)
0.193
(0.781)

-0.101***
(0.035)
-0.164***
(0.041)

0.148
(0.622)
0.430
(0.820)

0.092
(0.658)
0.215
(0.886)

-0.102**
(0.042)
-0.166***
(0.052)

0.159
(0.667)
0.450
(0.914)

-0.631
(0.460)

-0.152
(0.273)
-0.284
(0.280)

-0.332
(0.260)
-0.273
(0.245)

-0.157
(0.280)
-0.121
(0.261)

-1.132
(0.945)
-1.400
(1.744)

-0.144**
(0.057)
-0.163
(0.113)

-0.880
(1.000)
-1.253
(1.852)

-1.133
(1.170)
-1.539*
(0.784)

-0.147**
(0.071)
-0.165***
(0.042)

-0.879
(1.194)
-1.371*
(0.822)

Sales*PRE last Harvester
departure
Sales*POST last
(B)
Harvester departure

0.013
(0.057)
-0.000
(0.058)

0.146***
(0.055)
0.177***
(0.057)

0.194***
(0.051)
0.220***
(0.052)

(C)

ROA*PRE last Harvester
departure

0.059
(0.192)

0.065
(0.187)

-0.080
(0.178)

(D)

ROA*POST last
Harvester departure

0.062
(0.166)

0.073
(0.188)

0.138
(0.209)
0.002
(0.010)
0.071**
(0.028)

0.032
(0.042)
0.369***
(0.099)

0.001
(0.002)
0.003
(0.006)

0.038
(0.046)
0.400***
(0.106)

0.032
(.047)
0.419***
(0.127)

POST 1st CEO change
POST 2nd CEO change
POST 3rd CEO change
POST 4th CEO change
POST 5th CEO change
(A)

Lag Tobin’s Q*PRE last
Harvester departure
Lag Tobin’s Q*POST
(F)
last Harvester departure

(E)

0.001
(0.002)

Lag Tobin’s Q
(G)

Lag LN Assets*PRE last
Harvester departure

0.259***
(0.059)

0.877***
(0.200)

0.046***
(0.011)

0.881***
(0.218)

(H)

Lag LN Assets*POST
last Harvester departure

0.271***
(0.062)

0.836***
(0.211)

0.044***
(0.011)

0.840***
(0.230)

Lag LN Assets
Observations
Adj. R2

0.038
(.051)
0.442***
(0.137)

0.854***
(0.249)

0.045***
(0.013)

0.860***
(0.265)

866

1,365

1,377

1,338

1,338

1,338

1,338

1,338

1,338

1,338

0.509

0.476

0.448

0.434

0.367

0.487

0.337

0.367

0.488

0.338
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Table 7. Last Harvester Departure Treatment Effect on Post-vs-Pre Departure Levels of Compensation1
DV = CEO Compensation 2:

(1) ln(Total)

(2) ln(Total)3

(3) ln(Total)4

(4) ln(Total)

(5) Total

(6) Direct

(7) Equity

(8) Total

(9) Direct

(10) Equity

Panel B. Tests of Coefficients and of Margins Contrasts
Margins
Tests:

(E) = (F)

χ2 5.63**
p-val 0.018

χ2 10.63***
p-val 0.001

χ2 0.13
p-val 0.721

χ2 10.73***
p-val 0.001

(G) = (H)

χ2 0.50
p-val 0.479

χ2 0.49
p-val 0.483

χ2 0.36
p-val 0.549

χ2 0.43
p-val 0.510

Test5 (β1+ β2+ β3)|treated=0
vs. (β1+ β2+ β3)|treated=1

F-stat 8.90***
p-val 0.003

F-stat 0.26 F-stat 24.58***
p-val 0.612
p-val <0.001

F-stat 8.28***
p-val 0.005

F-stat 0.00
p-val 0.999

1

Difference-in-differences regressions, using a 1-to-1 matched sample of harvester-backed IPOs (harvesters being directors representing VC and PEG funds that invested in the IPOs and needing to
“harvest” their investment post-IPO), of a pre-vs-post last harvester exit period difference in compensation, differenced between treated and control firms. All firms in the matched sample were chosen
from the initial EGC IPO sample used in Tables 1 through 5. All firms in the sample have harvesters on the board, but matched control firms have not yet experienced the last harvester departure. 80
“Treated” firms in the original sample experienced the departure of the last harvester from their board during the sample period, but 3 treated firms were unmatched by 2-digit SIC code and were
excluded from the matched sample. Each of the remaining 77 treated firms (representing 726 firm-year observations) was matched with a control firm by 2-digit SIC code and the condition that the
matched firm-years had to include the same fiscal year as the fiscal year in which the last harvester departed from a treated firm’s board (e.g., for a treated firm with a last harvester departure in 2008, the
matched control firm’s firm-years had to include 2008). 43 firms were also matched on IPO year and on CEO turnover. Another 29 firms were also matched only on CEO turnover without regard to
match by IPO year. The final 5 firms were matched without regard to IPO year or CEO turnover. In cases where a treated firm was initially matched with multiple control firms, the best match was
chosen by minimizing the difference in ROA in the fiscal year that coincided with the last harvester departure year. For each firm, all firm-years with available data were included. The final combined
sample contained 1,482 firm-year observations. Sample size varies by Model due to missing information for that Model’s variables.
CEO compensation as reported in BoardEx or ExecuComp (in millions of dollars). Direct compensation includes salary plus cash bonus. Equity compensation is “equity-linked” compensation, as
reported, which includes stock, options, LTIPS and other equity-based components of compensation. Total is the sum of Direct plus Equity compensation.
2

3

Model (2) differs only from Model (1) by not including tenure.
Model (3) differs from Model (2) only in using year fixed effects instead of industry-year fixed effects.
Models (1)-(2) include industry-year and firm fixed effects, while Models (3)-(10) include year and firm fixed effects. Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) do not use a matched sample, thus industry-year
fixed effects are appropriate. My sample matches by industry in all matched firms, so while year effects are still relevant, industry effects are less so. Untabulated regressions including industry-year
fixed effects indicate qualitatively similar results, though standard errors increase. Notably, the only coefficients with changes in significance are that POST 1st CEO change becomes significant in
Models (8) and (10). Otherwise, all margins and margins contrasts tests maintain the same (in-)significance as in the tabulated results.
Model (1) includes an estimated effect for tenure, which is insignificant (β=-0.018, s.e.=0.012, p-val 0.128) and is not carried forward into other models.
Models (1)-(7) follow the Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) regression specification, which excludes estimation of main effects for interaction terms, whereas Models (8)-(10) include them.
Models (1)-(4) follow the Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) DV specification of log of compensation, whereas Models (5)-(10) revert to the untransformed DVs, consistent with the rest of the analysis.
Models (1)-(7) follow the Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) regression specification, interacting pre-vs-post period dummy with controls. However, as the Assets coefficients are not different in Models
(5)-(7), and Tobins Q coefficients are not different in Model (6), those interactions are removed in Models (8)-(10), respectively.
Models (1)-(7) estimated using REGHDFE command in Stata 14.2; Models (8)-(10) estimated using REGRESS command in Stata 14.2.
4

Sales is the natural log of firm revenues. ROA is the natural log of 1 plus the ratio of EBITDA divided by total assets. Lag LN Assets is the natural log of lagged total assets.
5

Contrast of margins is unable to estimate test of contrasts. As a rudimentary substitute, I present an F-test of the main and interaction coefficients. Untabulated margins tests of (A) = (B) and of (C) =
(D) (i.e., the Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) control variables) reject that the PRE-vs-POST estimated coefficients are equal for Sales but not for ROA. The Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) control
variables are replaced after Model (3), so results of these tests are omitted from the table.
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered by firm-years for Models (1)-(7) following the Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) specification, and clustered by firm for Models (8)-(10). Clustering by firmyear treats separate firm-years as independent, while clustering by firm considers the intertemporal correlation across firm-years for each firm. Untabulated regressions firm for Models (8)-(10)
clustering by firm-year indicate qualitatively similar results, with smaller standard errors, as expected.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8. Last Harvester Departure Treatment Effect on Year After
Departure Compensation1
DV = CEO Compensation:
β1

Treated
Non-harvester departures last year
Not last Harvester departures last year

β2

Last Harvester departure last year

β3

Treated* Last Harvester departure last year
CEO turnover this year

(1) Equity

(2) Direct

(3) Total

0.696
(0.548)
-0.402
(0.264)

0.148***
(0.028)
-0.011
(0.018)

0.905*
(0.527)
-0.402
(0.258)

0.194
(0.655)
0.008
(0.234)

0.015
(0.042)
-0.035
(0.022)

0.135
(0.598)
-0.007
(0.226)

-0.898**
(0.386)
1.050**
(0.451)

0.012
(0.027)
-0.089***
(0.022)

-0.867**
(0.373)
0.875**
(0.414)

0.043
(0.051)

0.001
(0.002)

0.038
(0.047)

0.937***
(0.278)

0.047***
(0.013)

0.933***
(0.259)

1,338
0.340

1,338
0.494

1,338
0.368

F-stat 0.11
p-val 0.740

F-stat 19.06***
p-val <0.001

F-stat 0.00
p-val 0.946

Control variables
Lagged Tobin’s Q
Lagged ln Total Assets
Observations
Adj. R2
Test2 (β1+ β2+ β3)|treated=0
vs. (β1+ β2+ β3)|treated=1

This table, using a difference-in-differences matched sample framework, re-examines the hypothesis regarding the effect of last Harvester
departure on CEO compensation, while controlling for size, growth, and CEO turnover. Models (1)-(3) present year of last harvester departurevs-other years difference in compensation, differenced between treated and control firms.
1

The sample is the same matched sample as I used for the Table 7 difference-in-differences treatment effect regressions. The Models replicate the
analysis from Table 5, with the addition of an interaction for Treated in order to compute difference-in-differences between treated and matched
control firms. “Treated” firms experienced the departure of the last harvester from their board during the sample period, while matched control
firms have not.
2

Contrast of margins is unable to estimate test of contrasts. As a rudimentary substitute, I present an F-test of the main and interaction
coefficients.
Standard errors, clustered by firm, shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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